Bohr's Relational Holism and the classical-quantum Interaction by Dorato, Mauro
 1 
Bohr’s Relational Holism and the classical-quantum Interaction1 
 
Mauro Dorato 
Department of Philosophy Communication and Media Studies 
University of Rome “Roma Tre”,  
Via Ostiense 234, 00144, Rome, Italy 
dorato@uniroma3.it 
 
 
1 Introduction: a conflict in Bohr’s philosophy? 
 
Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics has often been charged for what is allegedly one 
of its major shortcomings, namely the advocacy of an unambiguous classical/quantum distinction 
(let me refer to this view with the label the distinction thesis). As is well known, such a 
distinction is needed to defend Bohr’s view that any communicable measurement outcome must 
presuppose a classically describable instrument, with respect to which any reference to the 
quantum of action can be neglected (Bohr 1958, 4). Critics have then often insisted on the fact 
that the distinction in question is hopelessly vague (Bell 1987, 29) or at least strongly contextual 
(Ghirardi 2004), so that Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from the same 
vagueness and adhoc-ness. The resulting problem is, allegedly, a renunciation to describe the 
dynamical interaction between system and apparatus in a physically precise, theoretically based 
and non-contextual way, and therefore to offer a much-needed solution to the measurement 
problem.  
In my paper I will present and critically discuss the main strategies that Bohr used and 
could have used to defend from this charge his interpretation of quantum mechanics. In 
particular, in the first part I will reassess the main arguments that Bohr used to advocate the 
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indispensability of a classical framework to refer to quantum phenomena by trying to look at 
them from a new angle. I will then go on to discussing the nature of the indispensible link 
between classical measurement apparatuses and observed system that he also advocated. 
Typically, this link has been interpreted as a mere neopositivistic appeal to the fact that it is 
meaningless to talk about state-dependent properties of quantum entities independently of a 
measurement apparatus (Redhead 1987, 49-51, and Beller and Fine 1994). On the contrary, other 
authoritative scholars have rejected this minimalistic reading by stressing the fact that Bohr’s 
view implies the presence of a holistic nonseparability between quantum system and classical 
apparatuses (Bohm 1951, Folse 1985, Faye 1991, Whitaker 2004, 1324). Howard (2004) and 
Tanona (2004, 691) explicitly interpret Bohr’s relational view of a measurement by invoking the 
notion of entanglement. And it is clear that in this latter case, Bohr should have offered an 
explicit and well-articulated theory of measurement, a challenge that has been accepted among 
others also by Zinkernagel (2016) who, by relying on Landau and Litshitz’s brief treatment 
(1981, 2-26), insisted that the quantum system interacts with only a part of a classical apparatus. 
In order to evaluate this discussion and give due emphasis to Bohr’s holistic understanding of a 
quantum “phenomenon” (Bohr 1935 and 1958 among other sources), it is important to 
distinguish among different senses of Bohr’s “holism” and consider which of these can be 
reconciled with “the distinction thesis” that he also explicitly advocated.  
Let me add at the outset that in the following I will not try to argue that Bohr’s 
interpretation of quantum mechanics is free from any conceptual difficulties. Nevertheless, I will 
try to correct some frequent misunderstandings that many of his critics have fallen prey to. After 
the 1935 confrontation with Einstein, it is well known that philosophers and physicists attributed 
to Bohr a definite victory over Einstein’s criticism. But since the late sixties’ surge of interest in 
the foundations of physics caused by Bell’s theorem and his sympathy for alternative 
 3 
formulations of quantum mechanics (Bohmian mechanics and dynamical reduction models), 
Bohr has become been regarded as responsible – and not just by philosophers – for having 
“brainwashed a whole generation of physicists into thinking that the job was done 50 years ago” 
(Gell-Mann 1976, 29). It is about time to achieve a more balanced picture of Bohr’s contribution 
to the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The conclusion that Bohr’s interpretation of the 
formalism is untenable can only be established by giving his arguments as much force as 
possible, which is what I will try to do in the following by remaining as faithful as possible to his 
published work. 
 
2 Bohr’s recourse to classical concepts 
 
Various misunderstandings of Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics have certainly 
been favored by the obscurities of his prose that he himself later acknowledged (Bohr 1949, 
233),2 as well as by overly polemical remarks due to some his brilliant opponents. Here is one 
example: 
Rather than being disturbed by the ambiguity in principle ... Bohr seemed to take 
satisfaction in it. He seemed to revel in contradictions, for example between 
"wave" and "particle," that seem to appear in any attempt to go beyond the 
pragmatic level. Not to resolve these contradictions and ambiguities, but rather to 
reconcile us to them, he put forward a philosophy, which he called 
"complementarity." (Bell 1987, 189) 
 
A possible source of an important “contradiction” that to my knowledge has not received 
sufficient attention is given by the conflict between the sharp separation thesis and Bohr’s 
                                                
2 “Rereading these passages, I am deeply aware of the inefficiency of expression which must have made it very 
difficult to appreciate the trend of the argumentation aiming to bring out the essential ambiguity involved in a 
reference to physical attributes of objects when dealing with phenomena where no sharp distinction can be made 
between the behaviour of the objects themselves and their interaction with the measuring instruments”. Here he is 
referring to his Bohr (1935)’s reply to EPR. 
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holism, that is, his defense of the inseparability of the quantum systems from classical 
describable measurement apparatuses. As evidence for the former thesis, consider the following 
quotation: “The essentially new feature in the analysis of quantum phenomena is, however, the 
introduction of a fundamental distinction between the measuring apparatus and the objects under 
investigation.” (1963, 3-4) Even though, as we will see, Bohr does not identify “the quantum” 
with “objects under investigation”, it is well known that for him the “measuring apparatus” must 
be described with the language of classical physics, while the object of investigation is typically 
an atomic particle, not another classical object. Evidence for Bohr’s full endorsement of the 
holistic nature of any measurement interaction (the latter thesis), is provided a little further down 
the same text: “While, within the scope of classical physics, the interaction between object and 
apparatus can be neglected or, if necessary, compensated for, in quantum physics this interaction 
thus forms an inseparable part of the phenomenon.” (Bohr 1963, 4) 
This problem is in part a side effect of a persisting lack of consensus on what his use of 
“classical physics” really amounts to. In order to make some progress on this question, it is 
important to distinguish among at least six related reasons that motivated Bohr’s reliance on 
classical concepts. Even though some of these motivations have been already amply investigated, 
the perspective that I am stressing here is hopefully able to shed some additional light on each of 
them as well as on their logical relationship. My conciseness in this section of the paper can be 
justified in view of what comes next. Schematically, classical physics is needed 
1. To defend the intersubjective validity of physical knowledge.  
2. To provide a solid epistemic evidence for, and assign meaning to, claims about non-directly 
observable but mind-independent, real physical entities, that are codified in an otherwise abstract 
symbolism.  
3. By using the Principle of Correspondence, to defend the continuity of quantum theory with 
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classical physics in a period characterized by radical scientific revolutions. 
4. To be able to rely on a physical realm to which Heisenberg’s indeterminacy Principle does not 
apply.  
5. Following Einstein’s distinction (Einstein 1919),3 to formulate quantum mechanics as a theory 
of principle based on classical physics, and not as a constructive theory, in the same sense in 
which the special theory of relativity was formulated as a theory of principles (Bohr 1958, 5)4. 
This was meant to guarantee the completeness of the theory on the basis of the practical 
impossibility to use the wave function to describe classical apparatuses and atomic particles. 
6. To replace states of superpositions between object and apparatus by mixed states in which both 
have classical, definite properties, to be specified as a function of the particular measurement 
setup (Howard 1994). 
Let me expand in some more details on the five points above, with the exception of 6, 
which will be developed in the last section of the paper. 
 1. Bohr’s insistence on the indispensability of classical physics is first and foremost 
justified by the need of communicating in a non ambiguous way the results of scientific research 
and therefore, in particular, of experiments. Such a non-ambiguity, on which Bohr insists so 
much, is guaranteed by our reliance on a shared language. This point is of crucial importance and 
it should not be downplayed.5 As I understand it, “shared language” in Bohr is a technical term, 
since it refers to plain, ordinary language, supplemented and enriched by physical concepts 
derived from classical physics (Bohr 1958, 3). The role of a shared language is explicitly 
motivated by Bohr’s vigorous and explicit refusal of a solipsistic or subjectivistic interpretation 
                                                
3 In referring to this article, I will be quoting from the 1954 reprint. 
4 This point has been already stressed by Bub (2000), but used to defend an antirealist philosophy of quantum 
mechanics. 
5 See Petersen (1968). 
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of quantum physics that we would lapse into if this theory implied some sort of relativity of 
experimental outcomes to the observation of single individuals or to mental observations of 
human beings in general.6 In a word, given the indispensability of a shared language in the report 
of holistic quantum phenomena, the consequent elimination of any reference to subjective, 
mental states is blocked. The fact that language is shared necessarily leads to the view that a 
measurement is an “irreversible registration”, as Wheeler often put it a propos of Bohr (Wheeler 
1998, 337-338).7  
 2. The necessity of relying on a shared language takes us to the strictly related, second 
point, evidence. This second point does not just express the trivial fact that any piece of evidence 
in favor of physical theories, quantum mechanics included, depends on empirical reports 
expressed by a shared language in technical sense above. More importantly, there are at least two 
remarks that need to be stressed:  
  2.1 The first relates to Faye’s convincing suggestion that Bohr was an entity realist (Faye 
1991).8 The process of irreversible amplification due to the interaction between quantum systems 
and apparatuses described by a share language is in fact essentially causal. As a result of an 
inference to the best explanation, it follows that the macroscopic effects observed in any 
classically describable experimental device justify our belief in the reality of quantum entities 
regarded as causes of what we observe in the laboratories  (Hacking 1983). 
  2.2 In order to qualify what I stated in point 1 above, it is necessary to elaborate on what 
can be found in Bohr’s work. His belief in the unrevisability of the description of the world 
                                                
6 In some popular expositions we still read that quantum physics has vindicated the centrality of human beings in the 
physical world (due the role of the concept of observation).  
7 As is well known, Wheeler spent quite some time with Bohr in Copenhagen, and is therefore a reliable guide to 
report faithfully his thought. 
8 Faye’s hypothesis that Bohr was an antirealist about quantum theory is more controversial since, given that 
independently of other readings of Bohr (Zinkernagel 2006), it is not clear whether entity realism can be defended 
without theory realism. 
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afforded by the “shared language” vis à vis changing scientific worldviews does not entail that 
the new physical theories proposed in the 20th century do not put stress on the categories of 
ordinary language as they have been refined by classical physics (space, time, particle, wave 
etc.). It only entails that any imaginable evidential link between physical hypotheses and 
experiments presupposes that the manifest image of the world (Sellars 1963) – as it is expressed 
by our reliance on a shared language –cannot provide a completely illusory representation of the 
world around us. If we had to accept this conclusion, we would have no reason to believe in 
physics to begin with. In fact, our belief in a physical realm that goes beyond our unaided senses 
ultimately depends on evidence coming from our senses plus the referential power of “the shared 
language”, which also entails our belief in the reality of causal relations.  
           By using a distinction coming from an apparently unrelated philosophical corner, we 
could say that Bohr is not a revisionist philosopher of physics but rather a descriptivist one (for 
this important distinction, see Strawson 1959).9 Strawson’s main idea, that Bohr would have 
certainly endorsed, can be thus summarized: “there is a shared and universal conceptual scheme 
which we human beings have, and know that we have, and for which no justification in terms of 
more fundamental concepts or claims can be given.” (Snowdon 2009, 32; my emphasis). On the 
contrary, whenever there is some free room for different interpretations of physical theories, 
revisionist philosophers favor worldview in which the main tenets of the manifest image sense 
are overthrown. An example of a revisionist metaphysics is configuration space realism (see 
papers in Ney and Albert 2013).10  
 The task of the philosopher of physics for Bohr is rather to describe the way in which the 
                                                
9 The relevance for Bohr of an unrevisable conceptual scheme has been also stressed by MacKinnon (1982) and 
Murdoch (1985) and is of course at the basis of the Kantian readings of Bohr. 
10 Of course, whether one can go revisionist or not does not depend only on one’s philosophical taste, but is almost 
always strongly contrained by physical theories. 
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new quantum physics categorizes the world in interaction with the categories provided by the 
“shared language”. To put it in a nutshell by using other words, Bohr is against “quantum 
fundamentalism” (Zinkernagel and Rugh 2011, Zinkernagel 2016), which, in my way of putting 
it, is the view that quantum physics grounds conceptually and epistemically – but not 
ontologically, given Bohr’s entity realism – classical physics.  
 3. In his search for the new quantum mechanics, Bohr wanted it to be the case that it 
implied some kind of limitation but not a complete overthrow of the classical concepts. 
Consequently, according to him quantum theory had to be regarded as a rational generalization 
of classical physics that applies to physical phenomena in which h is non-negligible (Bokulich 
and Bokulich 2004, Faye 2014). In the same sense, general relativity is a generalization of 
Newtonian gravitation that applies when gravitational fields are strong, and special relativity is a 
generalization of Newtonian mechanics that applies when the relative velocity of bodies 
approaches c. Likewise, general relativity, with its manifolds with variable curvature generalizes 
special relativity, which is valid in infinitesimal regions of a Riemannian manifold, which can be 
considered to all effects Euclidean and therefore flat. 
 It is sometimes argued that Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics was mainly inspired 
by Einstein’s operationalist analysis of the concept of simultaneity. This claim, if correct, would 
make Bohr into a full-blown neopositivist (see below). While the influence of Einstein’s 
verificationist analysis on the physicists of Bohr’s generation and on Bohr can hardly be 
overstated, reference to the 1905 paper in discussions about the epistemic status of quantum 
mechanics is much more frequent in Heisenberg and in Born (1971). Despite their different views 
about the theory, Bohr agreed wholeheartedly with Einstein’s methodological approach to the 
construal of a new physical theory, which insisted on the importance to recover the previous 
theory from the successive one: “No fairer destiny could be allotted to any physical theory, than 
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that it should of itself point out the way to the introduction of a more comprehensive theory, in 
which it lives on as a limiting case” (Einstein 1920, 102). In our case, Einstein’s “pointing out” 
refers to the idea that any physical theory has in itself the germs for a generalization: it is in this 
sense that classical physics was for both Einstein and Bohr an indispensible heuristic means. The 
validity and truth of classical physics, in all three of the above-mentioned cases, is only restricted 
to some values of the variables intervening in the physical laws and not to all. The fact that 
classical mechanics cannot be extended to all possible values, as was thought beforehand, for 
Bohr did not mean that classical physics had to be abandoned, since the very concepts of 
“generalization” and “limiting case” imply – against unrealistic philosophies of science based on 
incommensurability (Faye 2014) or pessimistic metainduction – a full commensurability between 
the quantum and the classical epistemic and ontic domain. In a word, the epistemic reliability of 
classical physics was the main justification for an extension to the quantum realm via the rational 
generalization principle.  
 Furthermore, “mixed treatments” of quantum domains with classical theories11 that were 
fundamental in establishing the new mechanics (Bohr’s 1913 model of the atom) already implied 
that the latter had to be regarded in any case as approximately true, otherwise it would have been 
heuristically useless in predicting new phenomena: “The problem with which physicists were 
confronted was therefore to develop a rational generalization of classical physics, which would 
permit the harmonious incorporation of the quantum of action” (Bohr 1963, 2, my emphasis). We 
should realize that the importance of correspondence rules was particularly felt in a period in 
which, given the revolutionary changes happening in physics, a principle of continuity had to be 
reaffirmed in order to guarantee the rationality of scientific progress.  
                                                
11 This is common phenomenon in the history of 20th century physics: semi-classical quantum gravity mixes quantum 
field theory with classical general relativity, and is regarded as an approximation to a full theory of quantum gravity. 
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 4. The epistemic, foundational role of classical physics depends also on the fact that a 
classical measurement apparatus is not subject to Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations. Unlike 
atomic objects, a classical object has a well-defined position in spacetime and at the same time 
obeys the causal laws of classical mechanics (conservation of momentum). According to the 
distinction thesis, complementary magnitudes of the apparatus are always simultaneously sharp.  
However, as a consequence of Bohr’s complementarity principle, the experimental arrangements 
suitable for locating an atomic object in space and time, and those that are fit for a determination 
of momentum-energy, are mutually exclusive. Consequently, we cannot use the same apparatus 
to measure complementary magnitudes. Clearly, if an apparatus did not have a precise position 
before and during measurement (as confirmed by our senses), we could not measure the precise 
location where an electron hits a photographic plate. At the same time, the fact that, as we can 
see, a position-measurement apparatus always has also a definite momentum, i.e., it does not 
move, is what makes the measurement of the position of the particles possible. On the other hand, 
if the diaphragm suspended with springs did not have a precise position and momentum before 
during and after a measurement, we could not use the law of conservation of momentum to 
calculate the momentum of the particle that goes through it. In the next section, we will see 
whether Bohr’s response to Einstein’s thought experiment during the Solvay conference is not a 
withdrawal of the distinction thesis, since Bohr applies Heisenberg’s relations also to the 
macroscopic, classical screen suspended on springs, thereby apparently abandoning this thesis.12 
In fact this is an aspect of Bohr’s holism. 
 5. In order to provide a deeper understanding of Bohr’s reliance on classical physics, it is 
                                                
12 The localizability of macro-objects in spacetime is important for an additional reason, which is linked to the fact 
that space and time are principia individuationis: their localizability is sufficient to ascribe them an identity On the 
contrary, quantum particles are indistinguishable and come to possess an identity only when they are localized by a 
classical apparatus. 
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illuminating to recall Einstein’s distinction between principle physical theories and constructive 
physical theories (Einstein 1954, 227-232) and suggest that Bohr conceived of quantum 
mechanics as a principle theory – as Einstein did with special relativity – and not as a 
constructive theory (see also Bub 2000). The distinction is best explained with Einstein’s own 
words: “constructive theories attempt to build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out 
of the materials of a relatively simple formal scheme from which they start out” (Einstein 1954, 
228). A constructive theory for Einstein is the kinetic theory of gases, which explains thermal, 
macroscopic processes in terms of underlying molecular motions. On the contrary: “..The 
elements which form their basis and starting-point [i.e., of principle theories] are not 
hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural 
processes, principles that give rise to mathematically formulated criteria which the separate 
processes or the theoretical representations of them have to satisfy” (1954, 228). His example of a 
principle theory is thermodynamics, which “seeks by analytical means to deduce necessary 
conditions, which separate events have to satisfy, from the universally experienced fact that 
perpetual motion is impossible”.  
 Einstein regarded special relativity as a principle theory based on two very general 
postulates, namely the principle of relativity and the independence of the speed of light from the 
motion of the source. These postulates act as meta-laws (Lange 2013a, 2013b), that is, as very 
general constraints that all separate processes (“separate events”) governed by all lower-level 
physical laws must obey. As plausibly argued by Bub (2000), in Bohr’s philosophy of quantum 
mechanics the two general principles are the quantum postulate and the principle of 
correspondence, whose role is analogous to Einstein’s two postulates. Qua axioms of the theory, 
they exclude any attempt to further explain them by constructing them causally or dynamically, 
in the precise sense that Einstein gave to “constructions”. Of course, the two postulates of 
 12 
quantum mechanics do not function as meta-laws in exactly the same sense as the principle of 
relativity. Yet, when they were formulated, they fixed structural constraints about how to 
calculate transition probabilities (Bub 2000, 78). Furthermore, as argued in a later paper written 
together with Clifton and Halvorson, by changing somewhat Bohr’s two principles in order to 
introduce three information-theoretic axioms, it is possible to make the analogy with Einstein’s 
“theory of theory” approach even stronger. These three principles in fact “constrain the law-like 
behavior of physical systems” (Clifton, Bub and Halvorson 2003).  
 Even though Bohr was very probably unaware of the London Times article (Einstein 
1919) and of its later 1954 reprint, it is rather striking that – in order to justify his philosophy of 
quantum mechanics – he refers explicitly to Einstein’s purely kinematic foundations of the 
special theory of relativity. In his 1949 piece written in honour of Einstein we read:  
Notwithstanding all differences between the physical problems which have given 
rise to the development of relativity theory and quantum theory, respectively, a 
comparison of purely logical aspects of relativistic and complementary 
argumentation reveals striking similarities as regards the renunciation of the 
absolute significance of conventional physical attributes of objects. Also, the 
neglect of the atomic constitution of the measuring instruments themselves, in the 
account of actual experience, is equally characteristic of the applications of 
relativity and quantum theory. (Bohr 1949, 236, my emphasis) 
 
Notice that in the first part of the italicized quotation, Bohr is directing our attention to the 
historical process of relativisation of physical quantities that were previously regarded as absolute 
(“the renunciation of the absolute significance of conventional physical attributes of objects”). 
Exactly as in the special theory, spatial and temporal intervals “taken by themselves” become 
relative to an inertial frame, in quantum mechanics it is the possession of definite physical 
properties that becomes relative to experimental situations.13  
                                                
13 Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (1996) extends Bohr’s approach to any physical system, 
thereby avoiding any reference to a classical apparatus. For an evaluation of Rovelli’s attempt, see Dorato (2016). 
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 The second part of Bohr’s passage pursues the analogy with relativity one step forward, 
since it makes explicit the non-constructive character of special relativity. Unlike what happens 
in Lorentz’s dynamical theory of the inner constitution of the rulers, contractions of classical 
objects and temporal dilations of clocks don’t need to be explained bottom-up from a 
constructive theory, since they can be “explained” geometrically from the structural constraints of 
a four-dimensional spacetime that codifies the two axioms of the theory. Contractions don’t need 
to be explained from a dynamic theory because they are non-invariant (Dorato and Felline 2010, 
Dorato 2014). 
In the same spirit, according to Bohr the two axioms/principles from which quantum mechanics 
depend (quantum postulate and the principle of complementarity) render futile any attempt to 
construct classical objects out of underlying quantum entities with their laws. If classical objects 
could be explained bottom up by a theory T that fully reduced them to quantum properties, we 
would lack any evidence for T to begin with, since evidence must ultimately be expressed in 
classical language for the reasons already given. 
 There are however some differences between the epistemic and methodological 
foundations of two theories of which Bohr was certainly aware: quantum physics is committed to 
a greater amount of “relationality” and holism than the special theory of relativity. In the latter 
theory there is an invariant that plays the crucial role: the four-dimensional metric with its light 
cone structure supersedes completely the relational nature of space and time “separately 
considered” (Minkowski 1952, 75).  
 In Bohr’s philosophy of physics, the relativistic invariant metric might be matched by the 
indispensability of a description provided by classical physics (the “experimental invariant”). 
This analogy, however, does not extend very far: the necessary presence of a classical 
experimental setup does not avoid complementary descriptions: apparatuses capable of revealing 
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the wave-like feature of an atomic object are incompatible with setups that are necessary to reveal 
its particle-like property. Consequently, the relational nature of a quantum property is by all 
means much more relevant than a classical one. Despite the fact that any experiment takes place 
in a particular frame, the fact that an observer O in frame F measures length L in relativity holds 
for all possible observers. 
 
In any case, the principle/constructive distinction has a double function. On the one hand, it 
illustrates in a clear way that Bohr drew inspiration from Einstein’s early methodological attitude. 
On the other hand, it is also very useful to account for their later divergence about the 
completeness of quantum mechanics, a fact that Bub (2000) and other scholars have neglected. In 
1905 Einstein is provisionally construing special relativity as a principle theory because of the 
poorly understood, dual nature of the underlying electromagnetic components of rulers and rigid 
bodies (Brown 2005, 72-73). He was convinced that in physics one should first proceed with 
principle theories as the case of thermodynamics and only later attempt to hypothesize 
constructive theories, which provide a deeper understanding of physical phenomena (Howard 
2015, section 6). To the extent that Einstein regarded quantum mechanics as a theory of principle 
that unified a lot of empirical phenomena without offering a deeper comprehension,14 we can 
understand his distance from Bohr, who thought that no deeper explanation was forthcoming 
because no explanation was needed. 
In fairness to Bohr, the fact that he regarded quantum mechanics as a principle theory for 
him did not entail the impossibility of any bottom-up explanation of the properties of classical 
                                                
14 Not surprisingly, Bub (2000) ignores this aspect of Einstein’s attitude toward quantum mechanics as principle 
theory, because he is mainly interested in using it to defend his informational approach to quantum mechanics (Bub 
1997).  
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bodies: “Although, of course, the existence of the quantum of action is ultimately responsible for 
the properties of the materials of which the measuring instruments are built and on which the 
functioning of the recording devices depends, this circumstance is not relevant for the problems 
of the adequacy and completeness of the quantum−mechanical description in its aspects here 
discussed.” (Bohr 1949, 223, my emphasis). Against Zinkernagel (2015), we should note that 
passages like this seem to imply that the quantum realm is ontically more fundamental than the 
classical realm, especially in view of the fact that Bohr was an entity realist. Of course, as noted 
above, an ontic primacy intended in this sense is compatible with the epistemic primacy of the 
classical physics illustrated above. 
The irrelevance in question is based on a very general fact concerning any kind of 
measurement in physics: the need for approximations and idealization, that in the case of 
quantum mechanics is due to the scale of phenomena: 
…the smallness of the quantum of action compared with the actions 
involved in usual experience, including the arranging and handling of physical 
apparatus, is as essential in atomic physics as is the enormous number of atoms 
composing the world in the general theory of relativity which, as often pointed 
out, demands that dimensions of apparatus for measuring angles can be made 
small compared with the radius of curvature of space. (Bohr 1949, 238). 
 
In addition to what we have presented in this section, we might add that the scale of the 
phenomena to be measured that renders a classical description unavoidable. 
 
3 Bohr’s relational holism and the classical-quantum interaction 
 
We can now return to the question that I introduced at the beginning of the paper: is there a 
conflict between the distinction thesis and the holistic character with which Bohr characterized 
any quantum phenomenon? On the one hand, the previous section has presented the main reasons 
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that drove Bohr to rely on the domain of classical physics as something ontologically distinct 
from that of quantum mechanics but necessary to gain empirical evidence about atomic objects. 
As his critics have insisted, however, this thesis, which for his approach is absolutely central, 
presupposes as a necessary condition the existence of a clear-cut, non-contextual criterion to 
distinguish the quantum from the classical realms.15 On the other hand, however, he insists on the 
“impossibility of any sharp separation between the behavior of atomic objects and the interaction 
with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena 
appear” (Bohr 1949, 210, emphasis in the original).   
A defender of Bohr’s interpretation could remark that the contradiction here is only 
apparent, as it is based on an ambiguity that is merely semantical: “lack of sharp separation” is 
compatible with “distinctness”. When Bohr talks about the “impossibility of a sharp separation” 
he is referring to a relational link between quantum objects and classical apparatus, or even more 
radically, to a form of holism or non-separability that has been empirically proved after Bell’s 
inequalities, and that EPR interpreted as a type of nonlocality that had to be avoided. Without 
some further assumption, the friends of Bohr insist, this notion of “non-sharp separation” is 
compatible with Bohr’s assumption that the classical and the quantum domains possess radically 
incompatible properties and are therefore ontically distinct.  
However, Bohr’s enemies note, where and how can we draw a clear-cut, non-ambiguous 
distinction between the two ontological levels if in the physical process of measurement these 
two levels interact? Suppose that the inseparability of the parts of a holistic “phenomenon” in 
Bohr’s sense implies also for Bohr an entanglement of the atomic objects with a classical 
apparatus (see Howard 1994, 2004). If one assumes at the same time the linearity of the evolution 
                                                
15 Furthermore, how can we come to know the wave function of the universe if nothing classical can interact with it 
from the outside? 
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equation and the completeness of the theory, as Bohr certainly did, one has then the problem of 
explaining the observed definiteness of the outcomes that are revealed by classical apparatuses. 
To avoid this problem, Zinkernagel follows Landau and Lifshitz’s approach to the measurement 
problem (1981) by (1) denying the existence of an entanglement relation between the atomic 
entity and the whole classical apparatus, and by (2) claiming that the former interacts only with a 
part of the latter (Zinkernagel 2016, 11). However, the problem represents itself also with this 
suggestion: how are we to distinguish the “part” of a classical object from the whole of it? How 
big must the part be for it to follow the laws of classical mechanics? Is there a precise, theory-
derived criterion that enables us to answer these questions? At this point Bohr’s foes could insist 
that the claim that the distinction between part of a classical object and the whole is contextual 
counts as a purely pragmatic solution to the problem. As such, isn’t it a just a way to sweep the 
dust under the carpet?  
In order to answer these important questions, we need to dig deeper into the meaning of 
“non-separable” in Bohr’s account of a “phenomenon”, and consequently into his theory of 
measurement, no matter how weak it is. In fact, without such a clarification, it is not clear 
whether Bohr’s “relational holism” is really compatible with the existence – on which his 
interpretation depends – of two clearly distinct descriptions of the world, one referring to the 
quantum and the other to the classical realm.  
First of all, all interpreters seem to agree that by talking about a “finite, uncontrollable 
interaction” between system and apparatus, Bohr assigns to the interaction a physical meaning. 
The interaction may cause an increase of information, but in virtue of this very statement one has 
to assume that here we are dealing with a physical, non-fictitious cause (i.e., the interaction). 
There is ample evidence for this claim in his texts: in his famous reply to EPR’s paper, for 
example, he discusses the consequences of measuring precisely the position of an atomic particle 
 18 
with a double-slit diaphragm and a photographical plate bolted to a common support.16 The 
interaction of the electron with the slit is finite because of the discrete, indivisible nature of the 
quantum of action. The fact that it is uncontrollable means that in these experimental conditions 
it impossible to come to know the momentum of the electron because it cannot be manipulated at 
will: the result of this impossibility is unpredictability and indeterminism. While Bohr is not 
always explicit about the nature of this uncontrollability, it is a consequence of a practical 
impossibility due to the smallness of the atomic particles, as well as to the fact that their 
dynamical behavior is analogous to the jump of an electron from an orbit to the other when hit by 
photons: in his response piece in the Schilpp volume, he refers in this respect to spontaneous 
emission processes and radioactive decays, attributing these examples to Einstein’s theory of 
radiation published in 1917 (Bohr 1949, 202). All of this terminology shows that the 
measurement interaction for Bohr is a physical, irreversible process. 
If this is to be taken for granted, there is still some important disagreement as to whether 
this interaction makes room for a genuine, even though qualified, “collapse” of the wave function 
(Zinkernagel 2016), or it rather only causes an increase of our information about the system 
(Faye 1991). In the latter case, the wave function is merely an instrumental, book keeping device, 
devoid of any ontological significance, while in the former the fact that the wave function 
symbolizes something, stands for something “out there”, needs to be further discussed.  
Bohr’s contextual view of measurement does not help per se to solve this dispute. It is in 
fact also non-controversial that the particular complementary property of an atomic entity 
revealed by an experiment depends on the particular setting that is appropriate to measure that 
property (either spatiotemporal properties or dynamical properties). However, there seem to be at 
least four senses of dependence that need to disentangled, since they are logically independent: 
                                                
16 The fact that this is an ideal experiment, as Bohr recognizes, is irrelevant for the point he wants to make. 
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beyond the problem of establishing which of these senses (maybe more than one) is defended by 
Bohr, I am interested in asking which of them renders his whole philosophical approach least 
amenable to criticism.  
The first sense of dependence is also the weakest, since it is compatible with assuming that 
also before a measurement any quantum system possesses a definite value of both position and 
momentum. These values however are unknowable in principle, due to the uncontrollable 
disturbance that the macroscopic apparatus causes in the measured system. Whether Bohr 
defended this position before 1935 is still controversial, but after EPR’s he certainly rejected it 
(see also Faye 2014, 13).17 After all, talking of “disturbance” implies that there is a definite 
property that existed before the measurement and that it is disturbed by it (Beller and Fine 1994), 
or at least it does not exclude it. It is not plausible to believe that Bohr did not see this logical 
possibility. 
In other words, this first sense of dependence is weak because it holds also in classical 
physics: the result of an experiment on a physical system – the experimental answer – depends on 
the kind of question we ask and is in any case influenced by the apparatus. However, in the 
classical case it is in principle possible to discount the effect of the apparatus on the measured 
system, so that it is much more reasonable to assume that experiments reveal pre-existing values 
of any physical magnitudes (even if it might be de facto rather difficult to determine them). As is 
well known, according to Bohr’s Complementarity Principle the story is indeed quite different. 
Bohr never tires of insisting on the fact that, as a consequence of Heisenberg’ principle of 
indeterminacy and the mathematical formalism, asking a “position-question” to an electron, and 
                                                
17 By referring to EPR, in his 1949 Bohr wrote “there is in a case like that just considered no question of a 
mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation during the last critical stage of the measuring procedure 
(Bohr 1949, 235). The “disturbance argument” was suggested by Heisenberg in 1930, in his optical, “microscope 
argument”. 
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therefore providing a spatiotemporal description, precludes in principle asking a momentum-
question, and therefore giving a causal description of the process, and conversely. The two 
experimental settings are mutually exclusive, even though for an exhaustive description of an 
atomic object we need both properties. 
 
The second, stronger sense of dependence, which is nearer to Bohr’s position after 1935, 
suggests that there is no pre-existing value that the apparatus measures and the coming into 
existence of a definite value is due to the measurement interaction. This is the sense of 
measurement that is assumed by EPR-type of arguments: since it is not possible that a 
measurement in a region of space causes an instantaneous coming into existence of the value of 
the distant particle, quantum theory is incomplete. Interestingly not only does John Bell – the 
staunchest opponent of Bohr – attribute him this second sense of “dependence”, but he even 
agrees with him that this the right view to take about measurement in quantum mechanics: “ the 
word [measurement] very strongly suggest the ascertaining of some pre-existing 
property…Quantum experiments are not just like that, as we learnt especially from Bohr. The 
results have to be regarded as the joint product of “system” and “apparatus”, the complete 
experimental set-up” (quoted in Whitaker 1989, 180, my emphasis).  
An obvious objection to the distinction between the two senses might come from 
neopositivist corners. For a neopositivist, in fact, there is no difference between the claim that 
there are definite magnitudes before measurement that cannot be measured due to a “disturbance” 
(first sense), and the claim that it is the measurement that causes the acquisition of a definite 
position or momentum previously undetermined (second sense). In both cases it would be 
meaningless to talk about magnitudes without a measurement, and in any case one cannot 
measure simultaneously position and momentum. Interestingly, to the extent that in Bohr’s 
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approach to quantum measurement there has been a transition from the first sense of dependence 
of measurement results from apparatuses to the second, there would be an additional reason not 
to count him as a neopositivist. Since without a verificationist approach one cannot move from 
the impossibility of simultaneous measurement to the impossibility of a common value, the fact 
that took so seriously EPR’s argument is another piece of evidence that he was not a neopositivist 
Conversely, as remarked as Whitaker (2004), the impossibility of common values conjoined with 
the projection postulate implies the impossibility of measuring complementary magnitudes.18  
Given this understanding of “dependence on measurement”, how did Bohr conceive of an 
atomic entity? If it were exclusively a particle or a wave, we could not explain the experiments: 
in the former case, it would not generate interference patterns; in the latter, it would not localize 
in the photographic plate. Likewise, for Bohr it could not be both a particle and a wave in the 
sense of De-Broglie’s pilot wave theory, where the particles’ velocities are fixed by guiding 
waves (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 28). More plausibly, for him it is neither a particle nor a 
wave until it interacts with a particular apparatus. One way to cash this out would be to argue that 
an atomic particle has two dispositional properties to be both a particle and a wave, depending on 
“the experimental question we ask”, that is, in the dispositionalist language, on the particular 
stimulus. Certainly this position seems closer to Heisenberg’s thought (1958) but it is interesting 
to go over the reason why Bohr did not consider it, independently of well-known personal enmity 
with the German physicist. 
We saw that two properties are complementary if and only if they are mutually exclusive 
                                                
18 “Once one has agreed to accept the [projection] postulate, it is easy to close the gap and to move from the 
impossibility of common values to that of simultaneous measurement. A measurement of momentum should leave 
the system in an eigenfunction of momentum; a measurement of position should leave it in an eigenfunction of 
position. Since there can be no common eigenfunctions, there can be no simultaneous measurements” (Whitaker 
2004, 1313) 
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and jointly exhaustive (see Murdoch 1987). Kinematical and dynamical properties of atomic 
entities are mutually exclusive because they cannot be attributed to the same system at the same 
time via a single measurement, but they are also jointly exhaustive because in classical terms, 
they are both necessary for a complete knowledge of the dynamical properties of the entity. 
However, from a dispositionalistic point of view, before the experiment we can attribute 
the same particle two irreducible and intrinsic dispositions (powers) for manifesting a particle-
like behavior and for a wave-like behavior, depending on the experiment. When one disposition 
is inhibited, the other is selected as a result of the interaction with the chosen experimental setup, 
in such a way that they two can never be manifest at the same time in a single experiment. The 
presence of two dispositional properties is the reason why complementary descriptions about 
spatiotemporal trajectories and causal properties of the atomic particle cannot be used 
simultaneously. Analogously, for the trajectory of the particle (its position) and the interference 
pattern: if we know through which slit the particle enters, the wave-like disposition is inhibited 
by the experimental setup. Conversely if we observe the manifestation of the wave-like 
disposition (the interference effect), we cannot know where the particle went because the 
particle-like disposition is inhibited. In both cases, the possession of both dispositional properties 
before the measurement interaction does not imply the possession of definite values for the 
respective magnitudes. If the possession of definite values is regarded as the categorical basis of 
the dispositional properties, the two dispositional properties are to be regarded, as they should, as 
irreducible to the categorical basis. In a word, an electron is neither a particle nor a wave, but the 
relevant dispositional properties coexist in the same particle.19 * 
In order to make the reasons for Bohr’s refusal of this interpretation explicit, it is sufficient 
                                                
19 One could adopt the same approach by invoking the existence of just one dispositional property. I am not going to 
explore this alternative here. 
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to point out that the holistic link between the atomic particle and the apparatus stressed by Bohr 
involves the manifestation of the dispositions – the measurement event – and not the two 
dispositions before measurement. In this sense, the dispositional approach – if it is not a merely 
verbal redescription of the holistic interaction between system and apparatus20 – would not help 
to clarify the nature of this interaction. Possibly, this approach might make this link even less 
perspicuous, by suggesting that an introduction of dispositions that get selected by the classical 
apparatus can by itself solve the measurement problem (as suggested by Suárez 2004).  
 
The third, more controversial sense of dependence calls into play the “nonseparability” or 
“indivisibility” of the measurement apparatus from the measured entity. It is important to remark 
at the outset that the fact that before measurement the measured system has no definite value 
(second sense of dependence) per se is compatible with the fact that before measurement 
quantum entities and classical instruments have an independent reality: the coming into existence 
of the definiteness of the conjugate variable depends on the apparatus, but the latter has 
properties that don’t depend on the former. In other words, according to the second sense, the 
dependence is asymmetric.  
This remark provides evidence for the fact that if indeed Bohr understood the 
“impossibility of any sharp separation between the behavior of atomic objects and the interaction 
with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena 
appear” (Bohr 1949, 210) as a form of holism, he was referring to a third sense of dependence, 
which implies the other two but is not implied by them. Likewise, in 1927, at the Como lecture, 
he wrote “the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena will involve 
an interaction with the agency of observation not to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent 
                                                
20 In Dorato (2007) I argue that it is not. 
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reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the 
agencies of observation” (quoted in Zinkernagel 2016, 11). In a passage like this, it is clear that 
the dependence we are trying to clarify is symmetric: not only does the reality of the atomic 
phenomenon depend on the apparatus, but also the converse is the case. Before trying to 
understand the nature of this third sense of dependence in Bohr’s philosophy, we should ask 
whether it is reasonable to attribute it to Bohr.  
In some cases, admittedly Bohr’s texts allow multiple interpretations: “quantum 
phenomena find logical expression in the circumstance that any attempt at a well-defined 
subdivision [between particle and apparatus] would require a change in the experimental 
arrangement that precludes the appearance of the phenomenon itself.” (Bohr 1956, 168). Here the 
change may be regarded as compatible with an asymmetric form of dependence, and therefore 
with the first two senses of dependence. This is probably why the neopositivist reading has it that 
according to Bohr it is meaningless to attribute a definite property to a quantum system unless we 
specify a particular measurement context, which functions as a frame of reference in the special 
theory of relativity: “To regard Bohr as endorsing a nonlocal or nonseparable conception of 
reality strains his carefully tailored language of measurement and his picture of the operational 
presuppositions on physical magnitudes posed by conditions of measurement” (Beller and Fine 
2004, 26).  
This neopositivist interpretation neglects the fact that the need to have a “well-defined 
subdivision” that Bohr is referring to in the quotation above presupposes that there is something 
to be divided, which in its turn implies that instruments and atomic particle form a one, a whole. 
This whole, however, cannot be studied without introducing some separation, whether 
conventional or not: given the holistic nature of what Bohr calls a phenomenon, “one must 
therefore cut out a partial system somewhere from the world, and one must make ‘statements’ or 
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‘observations’ just about this partial system” (Bohr 1985, 141).  
Let us then take for granted that in Bohr’s writings, ambiguous as they sometimes may be, 
there are important hints toward a stronger sense of holistic dependence such that, due to the 
measurement interaction, not only does the atomic particle lack a definite property, but also a part 
or the whole of the classical instrument does, because the description we give of it depends on the 
whole experimental condition. When we measure the exact momentum of an incoming particle 
by using a mobile screen suspended with springs (see Bohr 1949), we include this classical 
apparatus in the description of the holistic phenomenon in Bohr’s sense. The fact that the mobile 
spring is subject to Heisenberg’s relation implies that it is treated as a quantum system, 
independently of its size. In fact, as Howard has pointed out, the distinction between quantum 
and classical does not coincide with that between atomic system and apparatus. The fact that a 
measuring instrument can be described quantum mechanically implies that only some of its 
properties can be regarded as classical (that is, those that are correlated, e.g., the momentum of 
the particle before measurement and the momentum of the spring after measurement, see Howard 
1994, 214), but this implies, in virtue of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations, that the position of 
the particle before and that of the mobile spring after measurement are entangled, because they 
both lack definite properties. For these reasons a measurement of the particle position in this 
particular situation is impossible. 
Of course, talking of a third sense of dependence in terms of nonseparability or 
entanglement generates the problem of explaining our observations of a definite world within a 
theory that relies on a linear equation and is thought to be complete. However, since for Bohr 
there is clearly no room for a collapse of the wave function regarded as a physical process 
causally describable in spacetime, how do we justify the transition from a dynamic indivisibility 
between system and apparatus to the possession of a definite quantity on the part of the former? 
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Here I will focus only on three explanatory strategies. The first is to explain the transition from 
the quantum to the classical as the passage from an entangled pure state to a mixture (Howard 
1994, 203),). The second appeals to a view of measurement regarded as an irreversible physical 
process, due to Landau and Lifshitz (1981) and revived among others by Zinkernagel (2016), 
and, the third invokes the Bohmian’s holism of the undivided universe. 
1) As acknowledged by Howard himself, his thought-provoking suggestion to regard 
Bohr’s holism as a form of entanglement between the two systems is not grounded in his texts. 
Independently of questions of hermeneutic faithfulness, which here can be in part neglected, 
according to Bohr the third sense of dependence (the measurement-induced nonseparability 
between a property of the atomic system and that of the classical apparatus) is never such that the 
two systems are jointly in a pure state. For Bohr there is no measurement problem exactly 
because according to him there are no situation in which both properties of the system and the 
apparatuses before, during and after measurement are indeterminate, despite their symmetric 
dependence and despite the fact for Bohr a classical object can be attributed a quantum state (as 
in the case of the screen suspended with movable springs).  
There are at least two reasons for this claim. The first has been explored in various ways in 
the previous section: to summarize, in order to confer some meaning to our experimental 
practice, we must assume that at the end of the measurement interactions there is a classical 
object endowed with well definite classical properties. The second reason stresses the idea that 
quantum mechanics is a theory of principle linked to some intrinsic, insurmountable limitations. 
If there existed an underlying causal description that we’re able to construct or explain the 
definiteness of measurement outcomes bottom-up, this description in any case could not be given 
in a spatiotemporal language. To the extent that our form of understanding is limited to the 
intuitions of phenomena in space and time as Kant had it, this description would not add to our 
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comprehension of quantum theory. From this conclusion, however, the tension between Bohr’s 
need of a condition of sharp distinction between the classical and the quantum and his belief in 
the non-separate reality of atomic system and apparatuses – a nonseparability that does not 
prohibit treating a classical object as obeying Heisenberg’s relations and therefore to quantum 
mechanics – has not been completely removed. 
2. The second approach claims that Bohr’s holism is to be interpreted as an entanglement 
between particles and, crucially, only a part of the classical, measuring apparatus (Zinkernagel 
2016). The entanglement of the particle with a part of the classical apparatus calls into play 
Bohr’s appeal to the necessity of a “cut” between entangled stuff: “one must therefore cut out a 
partial system somewhere from the world, and one must make ‘statements’ or ‘observations’ just 
about this partial system” (Bohr 1985, 141).  
Zinkernagel draws inspiration from passages like these and, as we will see, from Landau 
and Lifshitz’s treatment (1981). He claims that the evolution of the wave function describes a real 
process in the world that cannot be given a purely epistemic meaning. At the same time, however, 
it cannot be subject to more fundamental explanations in terms of a constructive theory: “We can 
… say that, for Bohr, the collapse is not physical in the sense of a physical wave (or something 
else) collapsing at a point. But it is a description – in fact the best or most complete description of 
something happening, namely the formation of a measurement record”. (2004,14). In other 
words, not only is the wave function an abstract object defined in the mathematical model, but it 
also refers to an irreversible process of amplification in the physical world. This real process is 
the outcome of the entanglement of the atomic system with the part of the classical apparatus that 
is involved in producing a well-defined record. This interpretation of the measurement interaction 
can at least in part be traced back to Bohr, with the obvious proviso that the term “entanglement” 
does not explicitly occur in his work. Measurement results are due to “suitable amplifications 
 28 
devices with irreversible functioning such as, for example, permanent marks on a photographic 
plate” (Bohr 1954, 73).21  
However, this solution, despite its ingenuity, raises some difficulties: (a) given the 
existence of an entanglement, doesn’t Bohr need some sort of collapse theory, even if limited to 
the dynamic interaction between some part of the apparatus and the atomic systems? And if he 
does not need such a theory, as Zinkernagel claims by following faithfully Bohr’s texts, (b) 
doesn’t he still need a more precise account for the obtaining of a definite record in the part of the 
classic system that is entangled with the atomic particle? If these questions were left unanswered, 
typical objections concerning how to draw the boundary or a distinction between “a part” (which 
can enter in an entangled state) and a whole of a classical object (which cannot) would stick up 
their ugly heads again. It is at this stage that the notions of approximation and idealization might 
play an essential role.22  
In order to rebut the well-known charge that Bohr does not justify in a non contextual way 
the cut between the classical and the quantum it seems necessary to exploit the importance of 
position in any form of measurement that has been often signaled also by Bell: the classical limit 
involves the obtaining of a well-defined spatial trajectory in a bubble chamber, or as mentioned 
in the above quotation, ”the formation of permanent marks”. The answer to the question: “how 
do we identify the part that is entangled with the system?” may then be provided by an appeal to 
an approximation of a quantum system with a classical system. So classicality is given by the 
existence of a well-defined trajectory. This is essentially Landau and Lifshitz’s 1981 “Bohrian” 
account of measurement, which begins by noting that in order to describe the trajectories of 
                                                
21 The irreversibility called into play here is rather different from the temporal evolution in decoherent approaches to 
quantum mechanics, given that the latter involve, as noted by Schlosshauer and Kamilleri, improper mixtures, and 
therefore quantum states (Schlosshauer and Kamilleri 2012, 5), while in Bohr’s account the irreversibility concerns 
classical states. 
22 The notion of approximation or idealization is indeed crucial in Bohr’s philosophy (Tanona 2004). 
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atomic particles and attribute them dynamical properties, one needs apparatuses that can be 
regarded as classical “to a sufficient degree of accuracy” (Landau and Lifshitz 1981, 2). The two 
Russian physicists note that such apparatuses need not be macroscopic, but the deliberate 
vagueness of “sufficient degree of accuracy” allows us to count as apparatuses also microscopic 
instruments, which, I take it, is the source of Zinkernagel’s appeal to the entanglement between 
particles and “parts of a classical object”. In our case, the formula “sufficient degree of accuracy” 
refers to the track left by ionized molecules in a Wilson chamber; as noted by Landau and 
Lifshitz, the track is classical to the extent that it is very large with respect to the electrons, so that 
the latter becomes a quasi-classical object. On the other hand, they continue, the track measures 
the electron path with a very low degree of accuracy, which is the necessary price to pay for 
having definite outcomes and well-defined paths. In conclusion, the readings of the apparatus are 
described by quasi-classical functions and the fact that the apparatus is classical means that “all 
of these possible values have always definite value” (1981, 22).  
In order to comment on these neglected pages – to which, however, Zinkernagel makes 
explicit reference 23– we should note that measures that are realized with a “sufficient degree of 
accuracy” are used throughout physics and not just in the context of quantum measurements. The 
degree of accuracy cannot but depend on the aim at hand, and it is for this reason that the 
boundary between classical and quantum must depend on the context. According to Bohr, this is 
compatible with the fact that, for any given experimental context, the distinction between 
classical and quantum is always sharp and non-arbitrary.24 Contextualism would imply 
vagueness only if we tried to distinguish the classical from the quantum across all experimental 
                                                
23 I must thank Nino Zanghì for his suggestion to look at Landau’s treatment as one of the best defenses of Bohr’s 
interpretation. 
24 For Bohr, even though not for Heisenberg, the sharp distinction thesis did not imply a movable shift between the 
classical and the quantum. For him, there is a distinction between the contextuality of the boundary 
classical/quantum and its “changeability”. He accepted the former but rejected the latter, as recorded by Heisenberg 
in a letter he wrote to Heelan (see Schlosshauer and Kamilleri 2012, 4).  
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contexts.  
These italicized sentences go back to the main issue raised in this paper: a non-arbitrary, 
non-movable, distinction between classical and quantum is needed to cut definite outcomes out of 
an entangled mess (holism). On the other hand, contextualism and holism are called into play to 
take into account the principle of complementarity and the variability of the experimental setup. 
This alleged conflict is precisely the Achilles’ heel that his enemies have been focused on. Is 
Bohr’s contextualism really leading to a pernicious vagueness?  
The conceptual situation that we are facing in this case is very similar to the famous sorite 
paradox. Even though the concept of being bald is vague– in certain cases we don’t know how to 
distinguish between a bald person and a hairy one, and if pluck one hair at a time from a hairy 
person, there is no moment at which she becomes bald – at the extremes of the spectrum there is 
still a clear-cut distinction between baldness and hairiness. Likewise in the quantum/classical 
case: this fact, for Bohr is enough. If in any experiment we can find non-arbitrary borders at the 
extreme of the spectrum – say in terms of spatiotemporal paths – the distinction remains sharp 
and the vagueness of the borders in “intermediate” cases can be avoided.  
In conclusion, whether the opposition between distinction and contextuality implies a 
violation of criteria of physical precision, as Bell has it, is of course dependent on one’s own 
general philosophical intuitions of physics, or one’s stances (van Fraassen 2002). As such, as of 
now the problem cannot be settled only on the basis of philosophical or conceptual arguments. 
Until, of course, theoretical and experimental progress forces us to revise these stances. However, 
this experimental progress so far is lacking, and the alternative theories are not producing new 
predictions. At best, non-standard interpretations or theories are based only on a superior 
explanatory power. This epistemic virtue, while so far not sufficient to consider them superior 
also on empirical grounds, is certainly sufficient to encourage their practitioners to further pursue 
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new avenues: without Einstein’s philosophical worry on no locality, we would not have quantum 
computing and quantum cryptography. 
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